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ABSTRACT
We present a model in which the microstructure of trade in a commodity or asset is endogenously
determined. Producers and consumers of a commodity (or buyers and sellers of an asset) who wish to
trade can choose between two competing types of intermediaries: “middlemen” (dealer/brokers) and
“market makers” (specialists). Market makers post publicly observable bid and ask prices, whereas the
prices quoted by different middlemen are private information that can only be obtained through a costly
search process. We consider an initial equilibrium where there are no market makers but there is free
entry of middlemen with heterogeneous transactions costs. We characterize conditions under which entry
of a single market maker can be profitable even though it is common knowledge that all surviving
middlemen will undercut the market maker’s publicly posted bid and ask prices in the post-entry
equilibrium. The market maker’s entry induces the surviving middlemen to reduce their bid-ask spreads,
and as a result, all producers and consumers who choose to participate in the market enjoy a strict increase
in their expected gains from trade. We show that strict Pareto improvements occur even in cases where
the market maker’s entry drives all middlemen out of business, monopolizing the intermediation of trade
in the market.
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Web: http://www.econ.yale.edu/~gjh9In the early 1970s, the ﬁrm [ Cantor Fitzgerald ] vaulted to nearly monopolistic pre-eminence
in the bond market by doing something no one else had done before: Cantor began posting
government bond prices on computer screens for clients, mainly Wall Street bond dealers,
bringing transparency to a market where opacity and rumor had been the norm. 1
Why would I want to post my prices on the web? If I did that, my competitors could see what
I am charging and would undercut my prices by a few pennies, and I would lose most of my
business.2
1 Introduction
We observe signiﬁcant differences in the microstructure of trade in various commodities and assets. A
signiﬁcant share of trade in commodities such as wheat and pork bellies and in ﬁnancial assets such as
common stocks and Treasury securities is intermediated by market makers (also known as specialists), at
publicly posted bid and ask prices. Market makers typically either own or are members of an exchange
such as the New York Stock Exchange or the Chicago Board of Trade. However for other commodities
such as steel, virtually all trade is conducted by middlemen (also known as dealerbrokers in ﬁnancial
markets or “steel service centers” in the steel market), at individually negotiated prices. In the steel market
there are no market makers or exchanges where valid current bid and ask prices are publicly posted.
Instead, transaction prices are private information, forcing traders in the steel market to engage in search
and bargaining to ﬁnd a good price.
It is commonly believed that market makers and exchanges are appropriate for trading highly stan-
dardized commodities and assets for which the volume is sufﬁciently large to produce “thick” and “active”
markets. However, most types of steel coil and plate are at least as standardized as wheat or pork bellies,
and the volume of trade in these particular steel products is at least as large. A number of potential market
makers such as MetalSite, e-STEEL, and Enron have recently attempted to enter the steel market, but so
far without success. Enron went bankrupt in December 2001, MetalSite’s website was closed in June 2001
(although it was reopened in November 2001), and e-STEEL changed its name to NewView Technologies
in November 2001, reﬂecting a new focus away from steel. Thus, at present no market makers handle
a signiﬁcant share of trade in steel. So the ﬁrst puzzle is to explain why market makers such as Cantor
Fitzgerald have been successful in entering and transforming the trade in bonds, but not in steel.
1Zuckerman, Gregory, Ann Davis, and Suzanne McGee, “Before and After: Why Cantor Fitzgerald Can Never Re-Create
What It Once Was,” Wall Street Journal, October 26, 2001, page A1.
2A private communication to the authors by a middleman in the steel service center industry.
2The second quotation above suggests that even though new information technologies such as the In-
ternet make it nearly costless to post and update bid and ask prices publicly, it might still be unproﬁtable
for potential market makers to enter markets such as steel. If buyers of steel are accustomed to searching,
then middlemen can easily respond to the entry of a market maker by slightly undercutting the market
maker’s prices, stealing most of his business. So the second puzzle is to explain how a market maker such
as Cantor Fitzgerald can successfully enter a market such as the bond market if the existing middlemen
can respond by undercutting the market maker’s publicly posted bid and ask prices.
As a step toward answering these puzzles and understanding the differences in the microstructure of
trade that we observe across various markets, we present a simple model in which the share of trade
intermediated by middlemen and market makers is endogenously determined. Our model also provides
insights into the likely effects of the huge reduction in search and transactions costs resulting from the
information revolution and the advent of the World Wide Web. These technologies have facilitated the
rapid emergence of market makers operating web-based “B2B exchanges” that intermediate business-to-
business trade, threatening the existence of traditional middlemen in these markets. 3
Our model is an extension of a model of intermediation and search due to Spulber (1996a). Spulber’s
model has three types of agents: buyers (consumers), sellers (producers), and price-setting middlemen.
Since middlemen are often called dealers, we refer to Spulber’s model as an analysis of the dealer mar-
ket. Our main extension is to consider the effect of introducing a fourth type of agent, market makers. In
Spulber’s model, middlemen are assumed to be the exclusive avenue of exchange: every producer wishing
to sell a commodity (or asset) and every consumer wishing to purchase it is required to transact via mid-
dlemen rather than trade directly with each other. Transactions in the dealer market occur over a range of
individually negotiated prices — the outcome of a costly sequential search process.
We study the effect of introducing a monopolist market maker on the search equilibrium in the dealer
market. The market maker can be conceptualized as operating an exchange on which publicly observable
bid and ask prices are posted. Producers and consumers now have the option of trading on the exchange
at the publicly posted bid and ask prices, or searching for a better price in the dealer market. Since the
prices quoted by middlemen are not publicly posted, producers and consumers must obtain them by direct
3The rate of growth of B2B markets is nothing short of phenomenal: Forrester Research predicts that sales via computerized
market makers will expand ﬁvefold in the next two years and will account for at least 25 percent of all sales in 2002, and a total
volume of $1.4 trillion in transactions by 2004. These estimates may be conservative: alternative forecasts quoted in a recent
symposium on B2B e-commerce published in the Journal of Economic Literature are substantially higher. See, for example,
Lucking-Reiley and Spulber (2001) and Bakos (2001) for even more optimistic forecasts of rapid growth in retail e-commerce.
3contact (e.g., a telephone call), and the delays associated with searching constitute an implicit search cost.
Entry by a monopolist market maker is proﬁtable even if the market maker has higher per unit transac-
tions cost than most middlemen, provided that it is lower than that of the least efﬁcient middleman operat-
ing in the dealermarket before the entry of the market maker. If so, the entry of the market maker drives the
least efﬁcient middle men out of business and segments the market: the highest-valuation consumers and
the lowest-cost producers (i.e., those with the largest implicit search costs) trade with the market maker,
and the residual set of intermediate-valuation consumers and intermediate-cost producers search for better
prices in the dealer market. All of the surviving middlemen undercut the bid-ask spread charged by the
monopolist market maker. Thus the entry of the monopolist market maker creates additional competition
that results in signiﬁcant reductions in the bid-ask spreads in the dealer market, uniformly higher consumer
and producer surpluses, and higher trading volumes.
Middlemen and market makers represent competing institutions for the intermediation of trade. A
market maker offers a superior exchange technology for the highest-valuation buyers and the lowest-cost
sellers, and its entry raises welfare and reduces bid-ask spreads compared with the free-entry search equi-
librium when all intermediation is done by middlemen. On the other hand, free entry of middlemen
provides a “competitive fringe” that limits the market power of a monopolist market maker. Without the
competitive threatof middlemen, a monopolist marketmaker would quote awider bid-ask spread, and con-
sumer and producer surplus would be signiﬁcantly lower. However in some situations the market maker
can enter the market, drive all middlemen out of business, and set unconstrained monopoly bid and ask
prices in the post-entry equilibrium. Even this monopoly outcome results in a strict Pareto improvement
relative to the free-entry equilibrium that existed in the dealer market before the entry of the market maker.
The relative share of trade intermediated by middlemen rather than the market maker depends on three
parameters: the intertemporal discount rate d and the per unit transactions costs of the market maker k m
and most efﬁcient middleman k. For a broad range of parameter values, the market maker coexists with
the dealer market. However if the market maker’s per unit transactions cost k m exceeds that of the least
efﬁcient middleman k operating in the dealer market before the entry of a market maker, then entry by
the market maker is not proﬁtable and only middlemen will exist in equilibrium. Conversely, if the per
unit transactions cost of the most efﬁcient middleman k is sufﬁciently high relative to the transactions cost
of the market maker km, then the entry of the market maker drives all middlemen out of business. The
dealer market can survive the entry of a market maker even if the transactions cost k of the most efﬁcient
middleman exceeds the transactions cost km of the market maker – provided it is not too much greater.
4Our analysis is similar in some respects to those of Gehrig (1993) and Neeman and Vulkan (2001),
although our conclusions are quite different. 4 Gehrig studies a model in which producers and consumers
of a commodity have the option of trading at publicly posted bid and ask prices on an exchange run by a
market maker (which Gehrig calls an “intermediary”), or entering a “search market” in which consumers
and producers are randomly matched and engage in bargaining in an attempt to negotiate a mutually
acceptable price. Gehrig’s model differs from ours primarily in the formulation of the search market; he
models the bargaining process in the search market as a static (one-shot) random matching game in which
consumers and producers negotiate directly with each other rather than transacting through middlemen.
In Gehrig’s model the market maker always coexists with the search market and charges the same bid-ask
spread and trades the same volume regardless of the level of search costs in the search market. Neeman
and Vulkan (2001) obtain a very different result, namely, that the market maker can never coexist with the
search market in equilibrium. In their model agents have a choice between trading at posted prices with a
market maker in a centralized market and engaging in direct negotiations with a randomly chosen producer
or consumer in the search market. They prove a result similar to ours, namely, that the highest-valuation
consumers and lowest-cost producers prefer to trade with the market maker rather than engage in direct
negotiation. However, in their model the entry of a market maker causes a complete unraveling of direct
negotiations, and in equilibrium all trade is conducted in the centralized market by the market maker.
In section 2 we review a dynamic equilibrium model, introduced by Spulber (1996a), of trade with
search among competing middlemen. In section 3 we consider whether the dealer market equilibrium
characterized in section 2 can be upset by the entry of a monopolist market maker who runs a centralized
exchange with publicly posted prices. In section 4 we consider the case where there is free entry of market
makers, resulting in Bertrand-style competition that forces the bid-ask spread down to the transactions cost
of the most efﬁcient market maker. Although our interest in alternative intermediation technologies arose
from our observations of the microstructure of trade in the steel market, we believe our theory provides
insights into the microstructure of trade in a wide range of markets. In section 5 we discuss three other
markets besides steel: the market for goods in Radford’s (1945) P.O.W. camp, the U.S. equity market,
and the U.S. Treasury market. In section 6 we offer some concluding remarks and suggestions for further
research.
4We discuss related papers by Baye and Morgan (2001), Caillaud and Jullien (2001), Pirrong (2000), and Hendershott and
Zhang (2001) later in the paper. A number of other studies on the role of intermediaries deserve mention although we do not
explicitly discuss them. An incomplete list includes Garman (1976), Rubinstein and Wolinsky (1987), Yanelle (1989), Yavas
(1992), and O’Hara (1995).
52 Search Equilibrium with Middlemen but No Market Maker
Our point of departure is a simple exchange economy in which the only intermediaries are middlemen.
We present a modiﬁed version of Spulber’s (1996a) equilibrium search model with three types of agents:
producers, consumers, and middlemen. In this model producers and consumers cannot trade directly with
each other. Instead all trade must be intermediated by middlemen. Tokeep our presentation self-contained,
wereviewSpulber’smodelinthis sectionbeforepresenting ourextension ofhis modelinwhich weanalyze
the effect of introducing a fourth type of agent — a market maker. Since middlemen of the type studied in
this section are called dealers in a variety of ﬁnancial and commodity markets, we refer to Spulber’s work
as an analysis of a competitive dealer market.
The dealer market consists of a continuum of heterogeneous producers, consumers, and middlemen.
A producer of type v can produce at most one unit of the good at a cost of v. A consumer of type v







￿ be the probability of a producer or a consumer exiting the market in period t. A
consumer or producer may randomly exit before having a chance to consume or sell a unit of the good,
respectively. However, if they succeed in trading prior to exiting, the unitary supply-demand assumption
implies that these individuals will not make any subsequent transactions after their initial trade.
Suppose that whenever a producer or a consumer exits the market, he or she is replaced by a new
producer or consumer who is randomly drawn from U
￿0
￿ 1




Suppose that at time t












￿ the distribution of types will also be U
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fraction l of the population of producers and consumers exits the market and is replaced by an inﬂow of
an equal fraction of new producers and consumers.
In a dealer market there is no central exchange or marketplace where the commodity is traded. In
particular, there is no advertising or central, publicly accessible site where middlemen can post bid and ask
prices. Instead, the only way for producers and consumers to obtain price quotes is by directly contacting
individual middlemen. Middle men are inﬁnitely lived and set a pair of stationary bid and ask prices
to maximize their expected discounted proﬁts. There are a continuum of middlemen indexed by k, the
marginal costs of executing each trade between a producer and a consumer. Transactions costs k are
6distributed uniformly over the interval
￿k
￿ 1
￿ . The lower bound k is the marginal transactions cost of the
most efﬁcient middleman. It may not be possible for all potential middlemen to enter the dealer market and
make a proﬁt. We will let k denote the transactions cost of the least efﬁcient middleman who participates
in the dealer market in equilibrium. Thus proﬁts earned by this marginal middleman k are zero, although




￿ can earn positive proﬁts in equilibrium. A













￿ that maximizes his
expected discounted proﬁts, where a
￿ k
￿ denotes the ask price at which the middleman is willing to sell to
consumers, and b
￿ k
￿ denotes the bid price at which the middleman is willing to purchase from producers.
Producers and consumers engage in sequential search. Each period a searcher obtains a single price
quote from one middleman, drawn randomly from U
￿k
￿ k
￿ . Although there is no explicit cost to obtain a
price quote, there is an implicit “delay cost” involved in searching for prices. All producers and consumers
discount the future using the factor r
￿ 1
￿ l






reﬂects the rate of time preference, and the second,
￿ 1
￿ l
￿ , is the “survival probability” that accounts for
the possibility of random exit from the market prior to trading (in which case the exiting agent fails to
receive any gains from trade).5 The stationarity of the bid and ask prices charged by middlemen together
with the heterogeneity in their transactions costsimpliesthat the sequence of realized pricequotes obtained
by consumers and producers are independently and identically distributed (i.i.d.) draws from the stationary
distributions of bid and ask prices charged by middlemen. Let F a
￿ a
￿ denote the distribution of ask prices
facing consumers and F b
￿ b




￿ denote the present discounted value of an optimal search strategy for a consumer of type
v who has received a quoted ask price of a from a randomly chosen middleman. The consumer has three
choices: a) do nothing (i.e., do not buy at the ask price a and do not search), b) accept the middleman’s
ask price of a, or c) reject the middleman’s ask price of a and continue searching for a better price. These




































￿ is the support of the distribution of ask prices charged by middlemen. The value of 0 in
the Bellman equation corresponds to the option of not searching, not trading, and not consuming. All
5It is possible to extend the model by including explicit per period search costs g. However, it is not difﬁcult to show that a
stationary equilibrium in the dealer market cannotexist if g
￿ 0. Therefore we restrictg
￿ 0 in the analysis that follows, accounting
only for the implicit search costs resulting from exiting the market before having an opportunity to execute a transaction (the l
parameter), and the discounting of delayed gains from trade (the r parameter).
7consumers with sufﬁciently low valuations will choose this option. Clearly, any consumer with valuation
v
￿ a will never search or trade in the dealer market.
Now consider the remaining high-valuation consumers. As is well known, the optimal search strategy
for a consumer of type v takes the form of a reservation price rule: accept any ask price less than the
reservation price rc
￿ v
￿ , where rc
￿ v
































is the composite exit-adjusted per period discount rate. It is not difﬁcult to see from equation (2) that r c
￿ v
￿
is a strictly increasing function of v on the interval
￿ v c
￿ 1
￿ , where vc is the marginal consumer for whom










￿ denote the present discounted value of an optimal search strategy of a producer of type v
































￿ is the support of the distribution of bid prices offered by middlemen. The optimal strategy
for a producer of type v also takes the form of a reservation price strategy, but in this case it is optimal to
accept any bid price b that exceeds the reservation price rp
￿ v





















In the producer case rp
￿ v










is the marginal producer for whom the expected gain from searching is zero.








speciﬁc (equilibrium) pair of bid and ask distributions F a and Fb that will be derived shortly. Valuations
for buyers are plotted from high to low, whereas sellers’ costs are plotted from low to high, resulting in
notional “supply” and “demand” curves. However, actual transactions in this market are determined by
producers’ and consumers’ optimal search behavior. Consumers purchase the good from middlemen at


























￿ . Note that the reservation price function for producers, r p
￿ v
￿ , lies uniformly above the
8sellers’ supply curve, provided that the producer participates in the dealer market. It is easy to see from
equation (5) that when the seller’s cost v exceeds the upper bound b of the distribution F b of bid prices






remain out of the market. Symmetrically, the reservation price function for buyers lies uniformly below




￿61 of the distribution of ask prices F a.

















Figure 1: Reservation Prices for Buyers (Consumers) and Sellers (Producers)
Along the abscissa, buyers’ valuations are plotted from high to low, whereas sellers’ valuations (costs) are plotted from low
to high.
The difference between a consumer’s valuation v and his or her reservation value r c
￿ v
￿ is the net value
of search, i.e. the expected discounted surplus or “gains from trade.” For reference, we plot a horizontal
dashed line of height equal to
￿ 5 in ﬁgure 1. The area in the triangular regions between the 45-degree line
and this horizontal line (and to the left of the intersection of the “supply” and “demand” curves) represents
the surplus that consumers and producers would achieve in a frictionless Walrasian equilibrium, where the


















￿ . The area of
the triangular regions, i.e. the surplus achieved by producers and consumers in Walrasian equilibrium, is
1
5 8 and 1
5 8, respectively, resulting in a total surplus of 1
5 4. The area between the horizontal dashed line
and the reservation price curves represents the inefﬁciency of the search equilibrium outcome, i.e. the lost
gains from trade to producers and consumers.
Intermediaries maximize expected discounted proﬁts subject to the constraint that supply and demand
9for the commodity are equal in every period. This constraint is necessitated by the assumption that mid-
dlemen do not carry inventories across successive periods. Suppose a middleman sets an ask price of a.
Let Di
￿ a
￿ denote the mass of consumers who were among the initial population at t
￿ 0 who purchase the
























where N is the number (total mass) of middlemen, rc
" rc
￿ 1
￿ is the reservation price of the highest-
valuation buyer, and h
￿ r
￿ is the (conditional) distribution of reservation prices among the fraction 1
￿ v c









is the per-ﬁrm density of consumers. So Di
￿ a













































￿ corresponding to buyers who are willing to purchase at price a. By a change of
variables, the density h
￿ r
￿ can be derived from the distribution r c
￿ v
￿ and the fact that the valuations of

































































It is not hard to verify that, when l
- 0, the share of consumers who ultimately purchase the good is less





























This occurs since some of the consumers who attempted to search for the good ended up exiting the
dealer market before they were able to ﬁnd a sufﬁciently attractive price. This is part of the deadweight
loss involved in the operation of the dealer market. Another component of the deadweight loss due to
sequential search and the implied delay in trading and consuming is the discounting of the gains from
trade for those transactions that are ultimately realized.
Total expected discounted demand is the expected discounted value of the stream of demands in all
future periods by the initial population at timet
￿ 0 as well as the stream of demands from each succeeding
generation of new producers and consumers entering the dealer market. The subsequent entrants are drawn
10from the same U
￿0
￿ 1
￿ distribution of types as the initial population of producers and consumers at t
￿ 0,
but their mass is scaled by the factor l, the fraction of the population entering and exiting each period.












































































































































































































￿ is the reservation value of the lowest-cost producer. Given the discounted supply and



















































































































￿ in k implies that the distributions of the bid and ask prices F a and Fb
are uniform. To ﬁnd the support of these distributions, we need to compute k, the transactions cost of the
marginal middleman entering the dealer market in equilibrium. Plugging the solutions in equation (14)















































￿ 0, we see that the marginal middleman has a transactions cost of k
￿ r c
￿ rp,





￿ k. Letting k equal k and
k, we obtain supports of the equilibrium distributions of bid and ask prices. The upper and lower support
points of the distribution of bid and ask prices are functions of the highest and lowest reservation values of
buyers and sellers. This characterization will play a key role in section 3 when we analyze how the dealer
market is affected by the potential entry of a market maker.
Lemma 1: If k
￿ 1, there is a unique stationary equilibrium in the dealer market. Bid prices are uniformly
distributed on the interval
￿b
￿ b

































To complete the characterization of the dealer market equilibrium, we need to derive expressions for
the reservation values of the highest-valuation consumer r c and the lowest-cost seller rp in terms of the




￿ . Substituting the uniform distribution F a of ask
























Similarly, substituting F b and the formula for its upper support point b into the reservation price equa-
tion (5) for the producer with the lowest reservation value rp
￿ rp
￿ 0























Solving these equations for rc and rp, we obtain 1
￿ rc


































































We can see from these equations that as d
G 0 and k
G 0, the distributions of bid and ask prices converge to
a degenerate distribution with all mass on the single price p
￿
H
￿ 5, the Walrasian equilibrium value. We can




￿ 5, the Walrasian
equilibrium quantity. Thus the dealer market equilibrium contains the Walrasian equilibrium as a limiting
special case as search and transactions costs tend to zero.












Note that the dealer market collapses to a no-trade equilibrium as k
J 1. We also have N
G 0 in the limit
as d
G 0. In this case the dealer market is not collapsing, but rather converging to a degenerate distribution















5 2. This is a zero-proﬁt equilibrium, since the bid-ask spread of k just offsets
the transactions cost of the most efﬁcient middleman. As k
G 0, the competitive positive transactions cost
equilibrium converges to the frictionless Walrasian equilibrium outcome.
We conclude by providing formulas for proﬁts and surplus in this economy. These formulas will be
important in the next section, since they enable us to determine the relative efﬁciency of the dealer market
equilibrium compared with an equilibrium with possible entry by a market maker. Total consumer and




















































￿ v for producers who do not trade, so








￿ adjusts for the discounted
surplus of all current and future consumers and producers who enter the market.



































13We see from this formula that total proﬁts of middlemen tend to 0 as d
G 0 (due to convergence to a
zero-proﬁt competitive equilibrium) or as k
L 1 (due to convergence to a no-trade equilibrium).
The total gain from trade from the operation of the dealer market,Wd, is the sum of producer surplus,










￿ 125 and Pd












￿ 0, and k




￿ 0489 and Pd
￿
M




￿ 1471, which is only 59 percent of the maximum possible surplus of
￿25 that would be
achieved in a frictionless Walrasian equilibrium.
3 Search Equilibrium with a Monopoly Market Maker
In this section we extend Spulber’s (1996a) model of search equilibrium with producers, consumers, and
middlemen by introducing a fourth type of agent: a monopolist market maker. Initially we assume there is
at most one potential entrant who could assume the role of a monopolist market maker, quoting publicly
observable bid and ask prices
￿ am
￿ bm
￿ . If this market maker enters, producers and consumers can choose
between trading with the market maker at the publicly posted bid and ask prices
￿ a m
￿ bm
￿ , and searching
for a better bid or ask price in the dealer market.
We begin our analysis by characterizing how the presence of a market maker affects the solution to
consumers’ and producers’ optimal search problems. We then derive conditions under which entry by
a market maker is proﬁtable and compute the market maker’s optimal pricing strategy. In doing so, we
compute the dealer’s equilibrium response to the market maker’s entry and pricing rules. We then compare
equilibrium outcomes for economies with and with out a market maker. Finally we summarize the limiting
properties the model.
3.1 The consumers’ and producers’ decision rules
Consider a consumer who has not yet chosen to search. The consumer has three options: a) do nothing,
b) purchase a unit of the commodity in the exchange at price a m, or c) search for a better price in the dealer






































￿ denotes the value function for a consumer who has chosen to search and has received
an ask price of a from a middle man, modeled as a random draw from F a. Once the consumer has an offer






































Theorem 1: Suppose an equilibrium exists where the market maker coexists with middlemen in the dealer




be the value of the marginal consumer (with reservation value a m), who is indifferent between trading with






















￿ 1, then there are three different optimal search-purchase strategies depending on the con-




￿ , then it is not optimal for the consumer to trade with the market maker or to








￿ , then it is optimal for the consumer to









￿ , then it is optimal for the consumer to bypass the dealer
market and to immediately purchase the good from the market maker at the ask price a m.
We also have a symmetric result for producers, namely:




￿ be the value of the marginal producer (with reservation value b m), who is indifferent































￿ , then it is not optimal for the producer to trade with the market maker or to search for









￿ , then it is optimal for the producer to trade in the








￿ , then it is optimal for the producer to bypass the dealer market and to
immediately sell the good to the market maker at the bid price b m.
Figure 2 illustrates Theorems 1 and 2 for the case where d
￿ 0
￿ 2. The curved line in the left panel is the
net value of search for consumers, v
￿ rc
￿ v





￿ v. The straight lines plotted in each panel of ﬁgure 2 are net values of trading with the market
15maker at the publicly posted bid and ask prices
￿ a m
￿ bm
￿ ; that is, they are graphs of the functions bm
￿ v
and v





















￿ 25. It follows that





￿ prefer to trade with the market maker rather than search for a better











Thus these producers choose to search for a better price in the dealer market rather than trade with the





￿ would not gain from
trading with the market maker or with any middleman in the dealer market, and so these producers do not
participate and earn a net surplus of zero. Symmetrical results hold for consumers.
Figure 2: Decision Rules for Producers and Consumers
3.2 The intermediaries’ entry and pricing decisions
In the previous subsection, consumers and producers took prices as given. In this subsection we analyze
the market maker’s entry and pricing decision. We then derive the response of the middlemen to the market
maker’s entry. In particular, there are three possible regimes in equilibrium: an unconstrained monopoly
regime, a limit-pricing regime, and a competivitive regime. In ﬁrst two regimes, the market maker drives
all the middlemen out of business. In the competitive regime, a set of middlemen coexists with the market
maker. In the limit-pricing and competitive regimes, the existence or potential entry of middlemen in the
market limits the market power of the market maker.
All consumers know they have the option of purchasing the commodity from the market maker at
price am, and all producers know they can sell the commodity to the market maker at price b m. Clearly,
16no middleman in the dealer market would be able to sell at an ask price a higher than a m. Similarly, no
middleman would be able to purchase the commodity for less than the bid price charged by the market
maker. Thus we have:
Theorem 3: bm is the lowest reservation price of producers participating in the dealer market and a lower
bound on the support of the distribution of bid prices offered by middlemen. a m is the highest reservation
price ofconsumers participating inthe dealermarketand an upper bound onthe support of thedistribution








Applying the results from section 2, it is not difﬁcult to show that in the presence of a market maker F a




































￿ . Thus middlemen in the dealer market uniformly undercut the posted
bid-ask spread set by the market maker. Even though it is common knowledge that a randomly drawn
bid from the dealer market will be less than bm with probability 1, this bid will only materialize after a
one-period delay. The highest-valuation buyers and lowest cost producers prefer to trade immediately at
the less favorable prices offered by the market maker rather than incur the search/delay costs involved in
trying to ﬁnd a better price in the dealer market.
If the monopolist market maker sets an ask price ofa m and offers abid pricebm, Theorem 1 implies that



























































































m for all d
- 0, then it must also hold in the limit as d








Clearly the number of intermediariesthat can be supported inequilibriumdepends on howaggressively
the market maker prices. The following result shows that the number of middlemen operating in the dealer

















￿ , then the mass of middlemen who are active in the dealer














￿ 0, then as long as the bid-ask spread charged by the monopolist market maker is positive, the dealer
market will never be driven out of existence by the entry of the market maker. This will be true even if
am
￿ a, which is the lowest ask price charged by the most efﬁcient middleman (with cost k
￿ k
￿ 0) in the
search equilibrium without a market maker. The least efﬁcient intermediaries are driven out of the market,
and the remaining, more efﬁcient intermediaries are forced to reduce their bid-ask spreads below their pre-
entry values in order to avoid taking a loss. Therefore both the upper and lower supports of the distribution
of ask prices in the dealer market fall as a result of the entry of the market maker. Symmetrically, the entry
of the market maker increases the lower and upper support points of the distribution of bid prices in the
dealer market. This suggests that the entry of the market maker should result in a strict increase in the
expected gains from trade for all producers and consumers who participate in the market – regardless of
whether they choose to trade with the market maker or search for a middleman in the dealer market.
On one hand, the fact that middlemen uniformly undercut the market maker’s posted bid and ask prices
could make it unproﬁtable for the market maker to enter. On the other hand, if the market maker’s per unit
transactions cost km is sufﬁciently lower than k, the transactions cost of the most efﬁcient middleman,
the entry of the market maker might succeed in driving the entire dealer market out of existence. To
determine what will actually happen, we need to derive the market maker’s proﬁt function and optimal
pricing strategy. By Theorem 4 we know that bm
￿ 1
￿ am implies Qd
m
￿ Qs
m, and so we can write the







































Substituting the constraint bm
￿ 1
￿ am, the market maker’s problem reduces to maximizing the following

































18The market maker’s objective is concave in am and thus has a unique optimal solution provided the market
maker’s choice of am does not violate the search equilibrium conditions in the intermediary market. The
solution to the market maker’s problem and the resulting conﬁguration of the dealer market is given below.
Theorem 5: It is proﬁtable for a market maker to enter the dealer market if and only if the market maker’s









If km is below the threshold for proﬁtable entry km, there are three possible conﬁgurations for the post-








￿ . There exist thresholds 0
￿ kl
￿ km




￿ the market maker coexists with the most efﬁcient middlemen, but the least efﬁcient




￿ , the market maker’s entry drives all middlemen out of





￿ the market maker sets unconstrained monopoly bid and ask prices.
The fundamental condition for the viability of entry by a monopolist market maker given in equa-
tion (38) of Theorem 5 has a very simple interpretation. The expression on the right-hand side of equa-
tion (38) equals the efﬁciency level k of the marginal middleman in the equilibrium without a market
maker. Thus the monopolist market maker’s per unit transactions cost must be lower than the marginal
cost of the marginal middleman in the pre-entry dealer market equilibrium if entry is to be feasible. How-
ever the market maker need not have lower transactions costs than all middlemen in order for entry to be
feasible. Even if the market maker’s transactions cost is uniformly lower than the transactions costs of all
middlemen, the dealer market will not necessarily be driven out of existence.
Corollary 5.0: The thresholds kl and ku for the limit-pricing and unconstrained monopoly regimes satisfy
0
￿ kl



















We now complete our characterization of the post-entry equilibrium by summarizing the quantities
traded by the market maker, his bid-ask spreads, the number of middlemen, and the total quantity traded
in the dealer market.


















￿ bm. The dealer market is driven out of
existence.


















￿ bm. The dealer market is driven out of existence.
Corollary 5.3: In the competitive regime the market maker coexists with the dealer market. The market






























































Corollary 5.4: In the competitive regime the post-entry equilibrium mass of middlemen operating in the





















Corollary 5.5: In the competitive regime the equilibrium distribution of ask prices quoted by middlemen































































Corollary 5.6: In the competitive regime, the equilibrium mass of producers and consumers who partici-











20Figure 3: Market Maker’s Optimal Trade Volume and Ask Price as a function of k















￿2. In this case the
cutoff between the competitive and limit-pricing regimes is k l
￿
.
￿ 31, and the cutoff between the limit-
pricing and monopoly regimes is ku
￿
I
￿5. Note that the market maker’s ask price and quantity traded are
increasing functions of k in the competitive regime. As k increases, the dealer market gets increasingly
inefﬁcient relative to transacting with the market maker, and the market maker exploits this by raising the












￿ the market maker adopts a limit-pricing strategy,
choosing the largest possible ask price that will not induce entry by middlemen. As k increases in this




the most efﬁcient middleman is so inefﬁcient relative to the market maker that the market maker no longer
fears the possibility of entry and is able to set the bid-ask spread equal to the unconstrained monopoly level
of
￿ 75 and trade the monopoly quantity of

















3.3 Equilibria with and without a monopolist market maker
In this subsection, we compare the equilibrium with a monopolist market maker describe in the previous
subsection to dealer-market equilibrium described in section 3. Figure 4 compares the equilibria with and
without a monopolist market maker in the case where km
￿ k
￿ 0, and d
￿
*
￿ 2. The market maker trades
21a total quantity of Qm
￿
*










is less than half the total amount traded in the dealer market prior to the entry of the market maker. The










￿39, which equals the bid-ask spread of
the most efﬁcient middleman in the equilibrium without a market maker. The average bid-ask spread in
the dealer market nearly halves, from
￿ 1666 to
￿ 085, following the entry of the market maker. In this case,
the market maker’s bid and ask prices bm and am equal the highest bid price bd and the lowest ask price
ad, respectively, in the pre-entry dealer market equilibrium. The following corollary characterizes how
the market maker’s prices relate to the bid-ask prices prevailing in the pre-entry equilibrium in the dealer
market.
Figure 4: Comparison of Search Equilibria with and Without a Market Maker
Corollary 5.7: Assume that k







￿ be the supports of the pre-entry equilibrium distributions of bid and



















Proof: Using the formula for am in equation (42) and the formula for ad in formula (21), it is not hard to
show that am
￿ ad if and only if km
￿ km, where km is the threshold for which entry by the market maker
22is proﬁtable given in equation (38). If km
￿ 0
￿ k, then it is easy to see from equations (42) and (21) that
am
￿ ad. Symmetric arguments establish the results for the case of bids.
V
Corollary 5.8: Assume that middlemen coexist with the market maker in the post-entry equilibrium. Let
am and bm denote the lowest ask price and highest bid price set by middlemen in the dealer market in the












Proof: Using the fact that am
￿ 1
￿ bm and ad
￿ 1



















￿ , we see that am
￿ ad implies that am
￿ ad. Now consider the case where the entry
of the market maker drives the dealer market out of existence. Consider ﬁrst the limit-pricing regime.
Doing some algebra, we ﬁnd that am
￿ ad if and only if k
￿ 1. Now consider the unconstrained monopoly






5 2 characterizing the unconstrained monopoly regime implies that
am
￿ ad. As in Corollary 5.7, a symmetric argument establishes the results for bids.
V
Corollaries 5.7 and 5.8 formalize the notion that entry of the market maker lowers bid-ask spreads. In
the competitive regime the market maker’s bid-ask spread is strictly smaller than the worst bid-ask spread
charged by the highest-cost middleman in the pre-entry equilibrium. Since the market maker’s bid-ask
spread is necessarily the worst bid-ask spread in the post-entry equilibrium, it follows that the market
maker’s entry has succeeded in reducing both the average and the worst bid-ask spreads in the dealer
market. Indeed, the entry of the market maker not only narrows bid-ask spreads, but also shifts the entire
distribution of ask prices downward. That is, if we let ai and ai denote the support of the distribution of ask
prices in the pre-entry dealer market equilibrium
￿ i
￿ d




then assuming that the market maker and middlemen coexist in the post-entry equilibrium, we have
Corollary 5.9: If k












Since the distributions of bid and ask prices have strictly improved in the post-entry equilibrium, it
follows that all consumers and producers who participate in the post-entry equilibrium are strictly better
23off as a result of the entry of the market maker. Corollary 5.8 shows that even when the market maker
drives the dealer market out of existence, the market maker’s ask price a m is strictly less than the valuation
ad of the marginal consumer in the pre-entry equilibrium. Since the reservation price function for buyers
in the pre-entry equilibrium is strictly increasing in v with a minimum value of a d, it follows that all buyers
whose valuations satisfy v
- am are strictly better off in the post-entry equilibrium (where a m is the lowest






￿ denote the reservation price functions for consumers and producers in the dealer
market equilibrium before the entry of a market maker. Assume that k m
￿ km, so that entry by a market





￿ denote the reservation price functions for consumers and producers in the









































￿ . It is easy to see from the deﬁnition of rd
c in equation (2) that it is a strictly increasing function






















a is the distribution of ask prices in the pre-entry dealer market equilibrium. By Corollary 5.8 we
have am





















Now consider the case where the dealer market coexists with the market maker. In this case r m
c will be
strictly increasing on the interval
￿ am
￿ am




￿ , since these latter consumers trade
with the market maker by Theorem 5. By Corollary 5.8 we have am
￿ ad, so that it is sufﬁcient to show
that the slope of rm
c is strictly less than the slope of rd























￿ the slope of rm
c is zero, whereas from formula (54) we can see that the slope
of rd


























￿ we have drd
c
5 dv














￿ 1, where Fm
a is the post-entry
distribution of ask prices. If ad
Z am we are done. If ad











￿ . If km
￿ k
￿ 0, Corollary 5.7 implies that
24am
￿ ad, and we are done. Corollary5.9 implies that Fd
a strictly stochastically dominates Fm
a on the interval
￿ am
￿ ad






























Corollary 5.8), and since the slope of rm
c is given by formula (54) but with Fm
a substituted in place of Fd
a,










￿ . But by
Corollaries 5.7 and 5.8 we have am
￿ ad and am
￿ ad, and so the slope of rm
c
￿ v




￿ in the remaining interval
￿ ad
￿ am
￿ . Thus the slope of rm
c is strictly less than the slope of rd
c
over the entire interval
￿ am
￿ 1















Figure 5 illustrates the welfare gains resulting from the entry of a market maker. In this example we
continue to set d
￿ 0
￿ 2, km
￿ 0, and k
￿ 0. Any consumer in the interval
￿ am
￿ 1
￿ is made strictly better
off from the entry of the market maker, where am
￿
M
￿56 is the lower support point of the distribution of




￿ do not trade, and their welfare is not affected by the entry of the market maker. Clearly, the
entry of the market maker causes the lower support of the distribution of ask prices to fall. Thus there is
a larger set of active consumers in the equilibrium with a market maker, and the consumers who switch
from non-participation to search become strictly better off. Symmetric results apply to producers.
Figure 5: Comparison of Equilibria Before and After the Entry of a Market Maker
Along the abscissa, buyers’ valuations are plotted from high to low, whereas sellers’ valuations (costs) are plotted from low
to high.
25The entry of the market maker halves the volume of trade in the dealer market (from
￿ 3889 to
￿ 1944)
and the discounted proﬁts of middlemen, and cuts proﬁts to one fourth of the pre-entry level (from
￿ 0494
to
￿ 0123). However the market maker’s volume of
￿ 25 and proﬁts of
￿ 0556 more than make up for the
losses incurred in the dealer market, so that overall quantity traded and overall discounted proﬁts increase
following the entry of the market maker. Total discounted surplus of consumers (and producers) is
￿ 0782
in the post entry equilibrium (i.e., with a market maker) compared with
￿0489 in the pre-entry equilibrium
(i.e., without amarket maker). Totaldiscounted surplus(i.e., including thediscountedproﬁts ofmiddlemen
and the market maker) increases from
￿ 1471 in the equilibrium without a market maker to
￿ 2242 in the
equilibrium after the entry of the market maker. Comparing these total gains from trade with the
￿ 25 gains
from trade that would be realized in a frictionless Walrasian equilibrium, we see that the entry of the
market maker has increased overall market efﬁciency from 58.8 percent to 89.7 percent.
The rise in total surplus is due largely to the reduction in the deadweight loss of the transactions costs
of the less efﬁcient middle men who were forced out of business by the more efﬁcient market maker
(whose marginal transactions cost is zero). However, another source of the reduction in deadweight loss
is the reduction in search costs due to the entry of the market maker: in the post-entry equilibrium over
half of all trades occur at the bid and ask prices set by the market maker, so that a much smaller fraction
of trading is subject to search costs in the post entry equilibrium. We obtain these favorable results even
though the market maker is a monopolist: ordinarily monopoly power creates deadweight losses rather
than reduces them. Provided that the market maker’s transactions costs are not too high, publicly posting
bid and ask prices represents a superior institution for conducting trade via a search market.
The following theorem shows that entry of the market maker does not always increase total discounted
proﬁts: total discounted proﬁts increase in the post-entry equilibrium only when k m is not too high.
Theorem 7: Let Pm
￿ km
￿ k








￿ denote total discounted proﬁts of all middlemen operating in the dealer market in the pre-























￿ ,the entry of themarketmaker decreasestotaldiscounted proﬁtsfromintermediation(relative
to the pre-entry equilibrium value).


























￿ , which are common to Pm, Pm
d, and Pd
d, substituting the
formula for N in the pre-entry equilibrium in equation (23) into the formula for P d




















































































Substituting these expressions, we see that equation (58) is quadratic in k m and thus has two roots. One














￿ by Theorem 5. It is not hard to show that the other
root satisﬁes 0
￿ km










strictly convex function of km on the interval
￿ 0
￿ km
￿ . It follows that entry of the market maker increases











Figure 6 illustrates Theorem 7 by plotting the proﬁt functions P m, Pm
d , and Pd
d as functions of km for
k
￿ 0 and k
￿
^
￿ 6. Proﬁts of the market maker decline monotonically in k m whereas the proﬁts in the dealer




￿44. Above this point, entry by the market maker is











- km. When k
￿ 0 we have km
￿
D
￿ 12, so entry of the





￿ and decreases total proﬁts for










￿ 6. In this case the larger value of k has increased the lower threshold k m to
￿ 65 and the upper threshold
km to
￿77. Thus the range of km for which entry by the market maker increases total discounted proﬁts
from intermediation is a monotonically decreasing function of k, as is evident in the formula for k m given
in equation (57).
27Figure 6: The effect of entry on total discounted proﬁts for various km when k




Corollary 7.1: If kl
￿ km, i.e., if the entry of the market maker drives the dealermarketout of existence, the
market maker’s total discounted proﬁts exceed the total discounted proﬁts of middlemen in the pre-entry
dealer market equilibrium.
Since the entry of the market maker strictly increases both consumer and producer surplus, but can
decrease total discounted proﬁts from intermediation when k m
- km, the effect of entry on total discounted
gains from trade (i.e., the sum of discounted surplus and discounted proﬁts) is unclear. Figure 7 plots
a decomposition of total surplus in the two cases k
￿ 0 and k
￿
*
￿ 6. In each case, total gains from trade
increasefollowingthe entry of themarketmaker. However, wealso seethat total surplus isamonotonically
declining function of km until km
- km, at which point entry by the market maker is no longer proﬁtable. In
ﬁgure 7 we indicate the various equilibrium regimes by the symbols R 1 (for the unconstrained monopoly
regime), R2 (for the limit pricing regime), R3 (for the competitive regime where the middle man and dealer
market coexist), and R4 (for the case where km
- km so entry by the market maker is not proﬁtable). Note
that surplus is constant as a function of km in region R2 since, in this regime, the market maker’s bid and
ask prices are functions of k, not km.
28Figure 7: Decomposition of Total Gains from Trade for various km when k




The two panels of ﬁgure 7 illustrate how the competition between middlemen and the market maker
affects the division of the gains from trade between producers, consumers, and intermediaries. Consider
the case where the market maker has transactions cost k m
￿ 0. When the most efﬁcient middleman also has
transactions cost k
￿ 0, the dealer market and the market maker coexist and generate total gains from trade
of
￿2242, or nearly 90 percent of the Walrasian surplus of
￿ 25. Producers and consumers realize a surplus of
￿ 1564, or nearly 70 percent of the total discounted gains from trade. However when k
￿
D
￿ 6, producers and
consumers realize a surplus of only
￿ 0625, which is only one-third of the total gains from trade of
￿1875.
The market maker obtains the lion’s share of the surplus, earning the unconstrained monopoly proﬁt of
￿ 125. Thus the market maker is made better off, and producers and consumers are made correspondingly
worse off, by any measure that limits entry or increases the transactions costs of middlemen.
Similarly, middlemen can increase their proﬁts at the expense of consumers and producers by pro-
mulgating measures that artiﬁcially limit entry or increase the transactions cost of the market maker. For
example, the left-hand panel of ﬁgure 7 indicates that if middlemen were successful in passing a law
preventing the entry of market makers, total discounted surplus of producers and consumers would fall
signiﬁcantly. For example in the presence of a market maker with k m
￿ 0, total producer and consumer
surplus is
￿ 1564, whereas if entry of a market maker is prohibited, total producer and consumer surplus
would fall by 38 percent to
￿0977.
Althoughall ofour numericalresults indicatethat totalgainsfromtrade areamonotonicallydecreasing
function of km for km
￿ km (which implies that the entry of a market maker always increases total gains
29from trade for any km
￿ k), we have not yet been able to prove this analytically. Below we simply state our
conjecture that entry by the market maker is always welfare-improving.
Conjecture 8: Let Wd denote total market surplus in the pre-entry dealer market equilibrium, given in












p are total discounted consumer and producer surplus in the post-entry equilibrium, re-
spectively. Then Wm is a strictly monotonically decreasing function of k m for km
￿ km. In particular, for
any km








￿ , then the mass of middlemen operating in the pre-entry dealer market equilib-
rium is greater than the mass of middle men operating in the post-entry dealer market equilibrium. When
k
￿ 0, the number of middlemen in the post-entry equilibrium is never less than half of the number of
middlemen that would be operating in an equilibrium where entry by a market maker is prohibited.
Proof: Let Nd be the mass of middlemen in the pre-entry dealer market equilibrium, and Nm be the mass


























￿ , the total mass of producers and consumers who participate in the market is
strictly larger in the post-entry equilibrium than in the pre-entry equilibrium.














By Theorem 5, when k
- ku, the market maker drives the dealer market out of existence, so that Q m
d
￿ 0.
Thus the total mass of consumers who participate are those who trade with the market maker, Q m. By













￿ . In the limit-pricing regime we still have Qm
d







5 2. Since Qm
- Qd
d at k
￿ ku, it sufﬁces to show that the slope of Qm is steeper






￿ . The slope of Qm with respect to k is
￿ 1
5 2 which is less (i.e., steeper)
than the slope of Qd














30similarly. We need to show that the slope of Qm
￿ Qm
d is steeper than Qd























Finally, we summarize the limiting properties of the post-entry equilibrium as d
G 0, k m
G 0, and k
G 0.
Theorem 11: In the limit, as d
G 0, k
G 0 and km
G 0 the equilibrium prices, quantities, and producer and
consumer surpluses tend to the Walrasian equilibrium values. In the limit the market maker handles half
of the transactions in the market, and the most efﬁcient middleman (with k
￿ k
￿ 0) handles the rest. Both





This result implies that the coexistence of middlemen and market makers should be fairly robust in a
world of steadily declining search and transactions costs due to technological improvements in information
and communications technologies. However, the conceptual distinctions between middlemen and market
makers start to blur in the limit, since the prices charged by all surviving middlemen are virtually the
same as the bid and ask prices charged by the market maker. We view Theorem 11 as a characterization
of “efﬁcient markets”: when search and transactions costs are small, bid-ask spreads are very narrow, so
that there is not much difference between trading with a market maker and trading in the dealer market.
For this reason there is approximately a 50-50 split in trade between these two competing institutions.
However in the limit it does not matter whether the microstructure of trade involves only middlemen or
a combination of middlemen and a market maker. As we saw in section 2, we have convergence to a
Walrasian equilibrium even in the absence of entry by a market maker provided that d
G 0 and k
G 0.
The entry of a market maker is much more important when k or d is large. Conversely, if a market
maker is able to obtain unconstrained monopoly power by creating artiﬁcial barriers to entry by middlemen
or other, competing market makers, then large efﬁciency and welfare gains can be achieved by breaking
down these barriers and subjecting the market maker to competitive pressure to reduce bid-ask spreads.
In the next section we will consider the case in which the market maker faces competition from other
potential market makers as well as from middlemen.
4 Search Equilibrium with Competitive Market Making
Now suppose there is free entry into market making. If there are no ﬁxed entry costs and entry occurs
simultaneously, Bertrand-style price competition will ensue among competing market makers. Since all
31producers and consumers can costlessly observe the bid and ask prices quoted by alternative market mak-
ers, all trade will occur with the market maker that offers the best bid and ask prices. Bertrand price cutting
will result in two possible outcomes, depending on the heterogeneity in transactions costs. If there is more
than one market maker who has the smallest per unit transactions cost, price competition will result in a
zero-proﬁt equilibrium where the bid-ask spread equals the per unit transactions cost of the most efﬁcient
market maker. The division of trade among the competing most efﬁcient market makers is indeterminate.
If the most efﬁcient market maker has a strictly lower per unit transactions cost than the next most efﬁcient
market maker, the most efﬁcient market maker can earn positive proﬁts by charging a bid-ask spread equal
to the per unit transactions cost of the next most efﬁcient market maker.
However we think a model of sequential entry into market making provides a better approximation of
reality, as we will see in the examples we discuss in the next section. In addition, the ﬁxed costs associated
with entry into market making are likely to be substantial. These ﬁxed costs include advertising costs to
make everyone aware of the market maker’s identity and where his prices are posted.
In this case, the outcome of a sequential entry process depends on the order in which potential market
makers arrive and enter the market. If the ﬁrst potential entrant can enter proﬁtably, he will do so according
to a modiﬁed version of theory presented in the previous section. The ﬁrst market maker will enter if his
expected proﬁts from market making exceed the ﬁxed costs of entry. However his expected proﬁts will be
lower than the values computed in the previous section since he will anticipate that potential challengers
will eventually arrive and force him to limit price, i.e. to reduce his bid-ask spread to the point where
the most efﬁcient challenger will not expect to make a proﬁt after the challenger’s ﬁxed costs of entry are
taken into account. Indeed, a sufﬁciently efﬁcient challenger could even displace the existing incumbent.
In either case the entry decision of the ﬁrst potential entrant depends on his beliefs about how long he will
be able to earn monopoly rents from market making before these rents are partially or fully dissipated by
the arrival of more efﬁcient challengers for the position of market maker. A full analysis of this dynamic
“entry game” is beyond the scope of this paper. We simply note that the combination of ﬁxed entry costs
and post entry competition for the position of market maker will narrow the range of parameter values
for which entry by a market maker is proﬁtable. The precise parameter conﬁgurations for which entry is
proﬁtable will depend on a speciﬁcation of the ﬁxed costs of entry, and the ﬁrst potential entrant’s beliefs
about the arrival of challengers for the position of market making.
It should be clear from the analysis in the previous section that any additional competition between
potential market makers, in addition to the competition that already exists between middlemen and market
32makers, will result in further narrowing of bid-ask spreads and additional welfare gains for producers
and consumers. Total proﬁts earned by middlemen and market makers will generally fall as a result of
additional competition from new potential market makers, but this fall in proﬁts will be more than offset
by the increase in expected surplus accruing to consumers and producers.
The stationary equilibrium model used in this paper is not a fully satisfactory framework in which to
study the issue of competition between market makers. A model with stochastic arrivals of potential chal-
lengers might be one way to incorporate these dynamics, however there difﬁcult issues to consider when
there are multiple market makers and consumers are not all instantaneously informed of their existence
and bid and ask prices. If producers and consumers need to search in order to discover the bid and ask
prices charged by competing market makers, then there is the possibility of “market fragmentation.” In
this case, competing market makers may not be very different from competing middlemen: producers and
consumers will not know which market maker is offering the best bid-ask spread without undertaking a
sequential search process to obtain the best price quotes, and most of the beneﬁts of having a single market
place where credible bid and ask prices are quoted could be lost.
In addition, if there are elements of increasing returns to scale and network externalities associated
with having larger populations of traders (which enable a market maker to have a “thicker” and more
“continuous” market), there may be “natural monopoly” elements to market making. In such an environ-
ment the equilibrium outcome may be indeterminate, or there may be multiple equilibria. Caillaud and
Jullien (2001) analyzed the “chicken and egg” problems arising from the network externalities involved
in competition between market makers (or “matchmakers”) in a different framework. These issues are
worthy of further exploration, but they require a more complicated model than we have employed here. A
more realistic model will have to account for various types of non-stationarities and network externalities
in order to yield a more satisfactory dynamic analysis of competition in market making in which issues of
market fragmentation and natural monopoly can be addressed.
5 Applications
The theory in this paper is applicable to a wide range of asset and commodity markets. In this section we
look at four markets: the market for commodities in a World War II P.O.W. camp, the U.S. equity market,
the U.S. Treasury market, and the U.S. steel market. In the ﬁrst three markets we observe the co-existence
of both middlemen and market makers. In the fourth we observe only middlemen despite recent attempts
33by Enron and two potential web-based market makers, e-STEEL and MetalSite, to enter the market. In
light of the quotation at the beginning of the article, we discuss why the brokerage ﬁrm Cantor Fitzgerald
was able to become a market maker in the U.S. Treasury bond market whereas the two steel dot-coms have
not become market makers.
Perhaps one of the best-known examples (at least among economists) of the co-existence of middle
men and market makers is the World War II P.O.W. camp described by Radford (1945). In this camp,
prisoners traded a variety of commodities among themselves: canned milk, jam, biscuits, and chocolate.
In the absence of ﬁat money, cigarettes became a form of currency. Trade was facilitated by “Exchange
and Mart notice boards” on which bid and ask prices for different goods were posted. When a deal was
consummated, the posting was crossed out. Radford notes, “The public and semi-permanent record of
transactions led to cigarette prices being well known and thus tending to equality throughout the camp.” In
addition to the Exchange and Mart, middlemen were active in the camp, although they were viewed with
disdain:
Despite the fact that his very existence was proof to the contrary, the middleman was held to
be redundant in view of the existence of the Shop and the Exchange and Mart. ... And mid-
dlemen as a group were blamed for reducing prices. Opinion not withstanding, most people
dealt with a middleman, whether consciously or unconsciously, at some time or another. (Rad-
ford, 1945, p. 199)
In this camp the Exchange and Mart served the role as a market maker. Both current and historical bid
and ask prices were publicly and costlessly observable. As our model predicts, these middlemen did help
reduce ask prices. Radford does not mention whether middlemen had any effect on bid prices.
In the contemporary market for U.S. equities there is substantial interest in the question of whether
entry of middlemen can reduce the bid-ask spread of market makers such as the New York Stock Exchange
(NYSE). The NYSE is a collection of market makers known as specialists. Each specialist is responsible
for creatingamarketinone ormore individual securities. Eachholdsinventories,postspubliclyobservable
bid and ask prices, and reports a history of past transaction prices. 6 However there is also an active set of
middlemen commonly referred to as the “over the counter” market (OTC). Pirrong (2000) estimates that
the OTC market accounts for only 8 percent of the volume and 10 percent of the transactions in NYSE-
listed securities. Despite this small market share, the OTC market does appear to play the role of the
6Typically a specialist on the NYSE posts prices for only relatively small transactions. Almost all large transactions are
negotiated “upstairs” via middlemen; only after the deal is consummated is the transaction price publicly posted.
34competitive fringe as in our model. Although the evidence is mixed, several empirical studies, such as
Battalio (1997), document that the quoted bid-ask spread for NYSE-listed securities tightens when “third
market” dealer/brokers enter and compete against the NYSE to execute trades.
The NYSE also faces increasing competition from other potential market makers such as R. Steven
Wunsch’s computerized Arizona Stock Exchange (www.azx.com) and the Cincinnati Stock Exchange. In
recent years the advent of “electronic communication networks” (ECNs), competition from computer-
ized foreign exchanges, and a change to a more pro-competitive regulatory regime at the Securities and
Excahnge Commission (SEC) have subjected the NYSE to much more competitive pressure than it has
experienced in the past.7 This has forced the NYSE to make changes it had previously resisted such as
repealing “Rule 390”, moving toward 24-hour trading, and allowing prices to be quoted in decimals rather
than in 1/8 increments.8 Battalio, Greene, and Jennings (1997) studied the effect of a set of rule changes
in the early 1990s that made it easier to trade NYSE-listed securities on regional exchanges. They found
that, after the rule changes, bid-ask spreads decreased for about two-thirds of the securities in their sample.
Although the narrowing of bid-ask spreads that Battalio (1997) and Battalio, Greene, and Jennings
(1997) ﬁnd in response to increased competition is consistent with our model, it runs counter to the in-
tuition of a set of models in the ﬁnancial intermediation literature. See, for example, Easley, Kiefer, and
O’Hara (1996) and Fong, Madhavan, and Swan (1999). These papers emphasize the potential adverse
selection problem associated with competition between intermediaries. These models generally consider
two types of traders: informed and uninformed. If the middlemen are able to selectively trade with only the
uniformed traders (e.g. by only accepting small orders), then the market maker is left trading with only the
informed traders. This “cream skimming” by the middlemen leaves the market maker at an informational
disadvantage against the informed traders. In response, the market maker must widen his bid-ask spread
in order not to systematically lose money.
Within this adverse selection literature, Pirrong’s (2000) model is perhaps the closest to ours. He
considers the effect of competition between a monopolist market maker and a “third market” consisting of
middlemen. He focuses on the effects of entry by middlemen on an initial equilibrium with a monopolist
market maker,whereaswefocus on the effect of theentryofa monopolistmarketmaker onan initialsearch
equilibrium where there is free entry and exit of middlemen. Pirrong’s model has differently informed
traders, and studies whether the creation of a third market results in free riding on the price discovery
7See www.island.com for an example of an ECN with posted transactable prices and completely open order books.
8NYSE Rule 390, which prevented member ﬁrms from trading with middle in the OTC market, was repealed on May 5, 2000.
35provided by a monopolist market maker. The NYSE has advanced this latter argument to the SEC as its
rationale for the need to limit the formation of third markets and competing exchanges. However, Pirrong
concludes that “although free entry to the exchange would maximize welfare, encouragement of a free
entry third market may be a second-best response to exchange market power” (p. 2).
Our model is silent on this adverse selection problem, and, as noted above, does not address potential
network externalities associated with market making. In our model, free entry by middlemen provides a
signiﬁcant competitive threat to a monopolist market maker, forcing it to substantially reduce its bid-ask
spreads. This results in a signiﬁcant welfare gain to both buyers and sellers. Since middlemen undercut the
market maker’s quoted prices, their entry increases price dispersion compared with the initial equilibrium.
From the monopolist market maker’s point of view, this additional price dispersion is unnecessary and
evidence that the middlemen are free riding on its price discovery; however, from the point of view of
producers and consumers, any additional costs associated with the extra price dispersion are outweighed
by the beneﬁts of the reduction in the market maker’s bid-ask spreads.
Thirty years ago the secondary market for U.S. Treasury securities was dominated by middlemen.
Trades between dealers were made through a small set of inter-dealer brokerage ﬁrms. Trades were con-
ducted over the telephone, and dealers did not know the prices other dealers received, nor were customers
(e.g., pension funds) shown the prices dealers faced. However, in 1972 Cantor Fitzgerald, a brokerage
ﬁrm, began allowing dealers to see transactable bid and ask prices on computer screens. Dealers could
now see the prices other dealers received. As the quotation at the beginning of the article states, by making
its prices transparent, Cantor Fitzgerald “vaulted to nearly monopolistic pre-eminence in the bond mar-
ket.” In 1990, in response to calls from the SEC and customers for greater market transparency, several
of the major brokers in the inter-dealer market formed a joint venture, GovPX, to consolidate inter-dealer
data. Once consolidated, these data are transmitted in real time to customers through vendors such as
Bloomberg. In our view the Treasury market has been transformed from primarily a dealer market like the
one described in section 2 to a market with competitive market making like the one described in section 4.
Today trades in the inter-dealer market are made through brokers either by telephone or over an elec-
tronic transaction system (ETS). Like the market maker in our model, ETSs allow dealers to post trans-
actable prices and quantities and execute trades electronically. The Bond Market Association (2001) re-
ports there are currently 33 ETSs active in the U.S.Treasury market, but the two largest ETSs, eSpeed, Inc.
and BrokerTec Global, LLC, dominate the market.9 The Bond Market Association reports that although
9Cantor Fitzgerald owns 55 percent of eSpeed. BrokerTec is run and owned by a consortium of large Wall Street ﬁrms.
36the ETSs are capturing a large share of trades in the most liquid issues, trades in less liquid issues still
take place primarily over the telephone. We are told by Treasury market participants that the telephone
market is helpful in getting information about the depth of the market that is not always available on an
ETS. Although our model does not explicitly account for liquidity, one can stretch the model’s intuition
by interpreting a decrease in liquidity as an increase in the cost of carrying out a transaction. This would
suggest that liquid securities are associated with low k m’s relative to k whereas the reverse holds true for
less liquid securities.
Although precise data on the fraction of inter-dealer trades executed electronically are unavailable,
one (albeit noisy) way to measure the movement away from telephone trading and toward ETSs is to view
the fraction of total inter-dealer trades not captured by GovPX. Neither eSpeed nor BrokerTec reports its
trades to GovPX; therefore the trades recorded by GovPX are dominated by the telephone brokers. All
inter-dealerbroker trades,including thosemade through the ETSsare reported to the Federal Reserve Bank
of New York. Fleming (2001) reports that GovPX’s coverage of the total market has fallen in recent years
from 65 percent in 1997 to 57 percent in 1998 and 52 percent in 1999. Although certainly not conclusive,
this evidence suggests that the ETSs’ market share is increasing.
Although our model predicts that the rise in electronic trading should lead to a decrease in bid-ask
spreads in the inter-dealer market, bid-ask spreads are generally higher today than they were in 1997. In
particular bid-ask spreads widened substantially in 1998 during the Russian crisis and the near collapse of
Long Term Capital Management and have not returned to pre-crisis levels. We do not have access to the
high-quality transactions data necessary to tease out the effect of the ETSs on bid-ask spreads, taking into
account other broad market events (e.g., the reduction in U.S. Treasury debt during the second half of the
Clinton administration and the Treasury’s buy-back program).
Just as ETSs have transformed the U.S. Treasury market securities from one dominated by middlemen
to one dominated by market makers, it is not hard to imagine similar conversions happening in other
markets. In particular, we believe the U.S. steel market is a likely candidate for such a transformation.
Spulber’s (1996a) model of a dealer market provides a reasonable caricature of the current state of the
U.S. steel market. It is a highly competitive and unconcentrated market where over 5,000 “steel service
centers” (SSCs) play the role of middlemen between buyers and sellers of steel products. In 1998 three
potential market makers – Enron, e-STEEL, and MetalSite – entered the market. None has yet been
successful in garnering a signiﬁcant share of transactions. 10 From November 2000 to December 2001,
10Enron declared bankruptcy in December 2001. Although both e-STEEL and MetalSite are still in business, neither ﬁrm is
37Enron attempted to become a market maker in steel: it posted bid and ask prices on the web for coil steel
and held inventory in Chicago to ensure market liquidity. However, as we are writing this paper (in the
Winter of 2002), it is our understanding from discussions with executives in the steel industry (but outside
of Enron) that the prices currently posted on the web for Enron steel are several months out of date and that
Enron is exiting the steel industry. As far as we know, Enron went out of business for reasons unrelated to
its maker making position in steel.
In contrast to Enron, neither e-STEEL nor MetalSite claims to be an explicit market maker: nei-
ther holds its own inventories, and neither posts its own bid and ask prices. Instead, these sites operate
like the Exchange and Mart in the P.O.W. camp discussed above or like the “information gatekeepers”
studied by Baye and Morgan (2001). Information gatekeepers are web sites, such as Shopper.com or
Mortgage-quotes.com, that centralize dispersed price information and reduce search costs by allowing
buyers and sellers to post bid and ask prices on the web.
We can reinterpret the market maker in our model as an information gatekeeper that charges commis-
sions to buyers and sellers rather than buying and selling on its own account and charging its own bid-ask
spreads. Suppose the gatekeeper charges a per unit commission or transaction fee t to buyers and sellers to
post prices on the site. Thus if a buyer posts a bid of b and succeeds in transacting, the total per unit cost he
actually pays would be b
￿ t. Similarly, if a seller posts an ask price of a and transacts, the seller’s actual
per unit proceeds are a
￿ t. With a continuum of buyers and sellers, the only Nash equilibrium outcome is
for all buyers toposta common bid price band all sellersto post a common ask pricea. Forany given value
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km is the gatekeeper’s marginal cost per transaction (i.e., the marginal cost of posting a bid-ask pair on the
gatekeeper’s website). In this equilibrium a seller posts an ask price of 1
5 2 but net of the commission, re-





￿ bm, which is the same price the seller would have obtained
from a monopolist market maker. Symmetrical remarks apply to buyers. It is immaterial whether a market
has a monopolist market maker or a monopolist gatekeeper: both lead to exactly the same equilibrium
outcome.11 There can be no dispersion in the bid and ask prices posted on the gatekeeper’s website, but
capturing a signiﬁcant share of transactions. MetalSite shut down its website and all trading in June 2001, but relaunched it in
late November 2001. e-STEEL is now NewView and has switched its focus to licensing inter-enterprise software.
11The gatekeeper can use a variety of different commission structures to implement the same outcome as a monopolist market
maker. For example, the gatekeeper might charge nothing to buyers who post bids on the site, but a commission equal to
38there will be price dispersion in the dealer market due to the search frictions.
The crucial difference between the two steel dot-coms and the ETSs in the U.S. Treasury market is
price transparency. In the Treasury market dealers must post transactable, “take it or leave it” prices. The
ETSs in the inter-dealer Treasury market are designed so that no negotiation over price occurs (although
negotiation over quantity may still occur). Posted prices are available to all subscribers, and the history
of past transactions is made public. In contrast, e-STEEL and MetalSite are designed as “computerized
chat rooms” where private transactions are negotiated. Both websites allow buyers and sellers to post
prices, but next to each posted price is a “negotiate” or “counter-offer” button. From our discussions
with steel middlemen, we learned that these posted prices were much like the list price for a new car;
they represent ﬁrst offers, not take-it-or-leave-it prices. Negotiation is expected. Consequently these
two websites are more akin to a computerized extension of the existing dealer or telephone market for
steel, but where individual deals are negotiated by typing messages into a computer terminal rather than
conducted over the telephone. To the extent that most producers and consumers in the steel market ﬁnd
it easier to negotiate verbally by telephone than by typing messages over a computer terminal, e-STEEL
and MetalSite not only fail to perform the role of market maker, but may indeed constitute an inferior
technology for intermediation in the dealer market compared with the pre-existing telephone technology.
Furthermore, neither e-STEEL nor MetalSite posts historical transaction data, and both allow buyers
and sellers to limit who can view their own postings. There is a question on the “frequently asked ques-
tions” page of the e-STEEL web site: “Does e-STEEL create pricing transparency?” The posted answer
is “Since e-STEEL is not an auction, your pricing remains private. e-STEEL preserves your current way
of doing business since online negotiations and transactions between you and your trading partners are
kept private and secure.” This emphasis on privacy made it difﬁcult to learn about the current market price
of steel from visiting e-STEEL. We conclude that these two web sites are simply offering an alternative
communication channel to the telephone to enable buyers and sellers to negotiate privately. Neither fulﬁlls
the role of a market maker or an information gatekeeper that posts publicly observable and transactable
bid and ask prices. This may be part of the reason that these ﬁrms have not been successful in gaining a







c to sellers. In this case the equilibrium outcome would be for all buyers to place bids equal to am and all sellers
would place asks equal to am. The price received by sellers net of commission is then the same as the bid price bm that a
monopolist market maker would choose.
396 Conclusions
This paper has developed a theory of competitive exchange in which the microstructure of exchange is
determined endogenously. We have done this by introducing a fourth type of agent, market makers, into
the equilibrium search model with competitive middlemen introduced by Spulber (1996a). Middlemen
and market makers represent complementary and competitive exchange institutions: market makers post
publicly observable bid and ask prices, whereas prices quoted by middlemen in the dealer market consti-
tute private information that can only be obtained through a costly search process. We have focused on
the effect of entry by a monopolist market maker on an initial equilibrium where there is free entry by
competitive middlemen.




Figure 8 summarizes the range of equilibrium outcomes predicted by the model. The type of equilib-
rium outcome depends on three key parameters: the search cost parameter d, the per unit transactions cost
of the market maker km, and the per unit transactions cost of the most efﬁcient middleman k. The left-hand




rameters when the search cost is ﬁxed at d
￿
D
￿ 2. The model predicts that no market maker will be present
if km is sufﬁciently high relative to k (region 1), and that no middlemen will exist if k is sufﬁciently large
relative to km (regions 3 and 4). Region 2 represents the intermediate slice of
￿ k m
￿ k
￿ values that permit the
coexistence of middlemen and market makers. The right-hand panel shows the share of trade handled by
the market maker. In region 2 this share increases linearly in k for any ﬁxed k m or, conversely, declines
40linearly in km in for any ﬁxed k. We can conceptualize the steel industry as corresponding to values of
￿ km
￿ k
￿ in region 1 where entry by a market maker is currently unproﬁtable. In the securities industry, entry




are close to region 3 where the market maker engages in limit pricing; that is, it chooses the largest possi-
ble bid-ask spread subject to the constraint that this spread is not sufﬁciently high to encourage signiﬁcant
entry of dealer/brokers into the OTC market.
We recognize that there are several limitations to our analysis that qualify the types of conclusions we
can draw from it. First, as noted in sections 4 and 5, our model does not account for information asym-
metries or network externalities, which could affect our conclusions about whether entry by middlemen
or competing market makers always beneﬁts buyers and sellers in the market. A richer analysis would be
required to determine whether some intermediaries might free ride on the price discovery provided by a
market maker, so that market fragmentation could occur and raise traders’ search costs and reduce welfare.
If there are network externalities in addition to the information problems, there may be conditions under
which market making has elements of natural monopoly.
A second limitation is that we assumed that all exchange must be intermediated by either a middle-
man or a market maker. As we noted in the introduction, only half of the volume of trade in steel occurs
through middlemen; the rest does not occur through market makers but through direct transactions be-
tween producers and consumers. Hendershott and Zhang (2001) study an extension of Spulber’s (1996a)
model in which a monopolist producer can sell directly to consumers or through a middleman. Direct sales
involve lower search costs than intermediated sales. In equilibrium, the market segments. In a result anal-
ogous to ours, high-valuation consumers purchase directly from the producer, and intermediate-valuation
consumers choose to search for better prices in the dealer market.
A third limitation of our analysis is that we constrained supply and demand for the commodity for both
market makers and middlemen to be equal in every period. As a result, these agents have no inventory
holdings in our model. An important function of intermediaries is to hold inventory to provide a buffer
stock that offers their customers liquidity at times when there is an imbalance between supply and demand
(see Spulber, 1996b). In the securities business, liquidity means being able to buy or sell a reasonable
quantity of shares on short notice. In the steel market, liquidity is also associated with a demand for
“immediacy” so that a customer can be guaranteed of receiving shipment of an order within a few days of
placement. Lacking inventories and stockouts, this model cannot be used to analyze the important role of
intermediaries in providing liquidity.
41Although our model is highly simpliﬁed and stylized, it provides insights into the organization of a
variety of different asset and commodities markets. Consider the two puzzles raised in the introduction.
One puzzle was to explain how entry could be proﬁtable even if middlemen uniformly undercut the market
maker’s publicly posted bid and ask prices. Our explanation is that even though it is common knowledge
that middlemen offer better prices, the highest-valuation buyers and lowest-cost sellers still ﬁnd it optimal
to trade immediately at these prices rather than incur the search costs involved in trying to ﬁnd a better
price in the dealer market.
Theotherpuzzlewastoexplainwhymarket makers intermediate asigniﬁcantshare oftradeinﬁnancial
assets such as bonds and stocks, but virtually none of the trade in steel. Our model suggests that an
explanation for this puzzle is that transactions costs for market making are high for commodities such as
steel but low for ﬁnancial assets such as bonds. However this explanation may seem tautological. Why
would transactions costs associated with market making be so high for commodities such as steel and so
low for ﬁnancial assets such as bonds?
Recall that km can be thought of as including a “rebate” to buyers and sellers to offset any transactions
costs involved in transacting with the market maker. In ﬁnancial assets such as bonds and agricultural
commodities such as wheat and pork bellies, buyers and sellers (or producers and consumers) may be
relatively sophisticated and may be used to conducting transactions through a market maker at a central
exchange. Thus, their “hassle” or transactions costs may be fairly low, resulting in a low value of k m
relative to k. However, in the steel market, traders have little experience in conducting transactions over
an exchange. They may perceive relatively high transactions costs to doing business with a market maker
compared with their local SSC. Thus a new entrant to the steel market may face a different culture than
did the initial entrants to the bond or wheat markets, and this difference in culture could translate into a
higher effective transactions cost km as explained in the beginning of section 3.
However, the increasing penetration of computers and the World Wide Web seems to be gradually
changing the culture in the steel market, lowering k m and creating the possibility for proﬁtable entry. As
we noted, there have recently been several unsuccessful attempts at entry by potential market makers. This
may indicate that technology and associated cultural changes are reducing k m relative to k, moving the
market toward the boundary between region 1 (where entry by a market maker is unproﬁtable) and region
2 (where entry is proﬁtable). From our own observation of the steel market, we think it is only a matter
of time before successful entry does occur. Also, some of the problems experienced by the ﬁrst wave of
entrants into the steel market may have been due to the general effects of the dot.com crash of 2001-02,
42and some of these entrants (such as Enron) might have successed in entering the steel market had it not
been for problems in their other lines of business.
More generally, our model provides new insights into how the information revolution could affect
the microstructure of a variety of different markets. We expect that improvements in computing and
communications technologies will tend to drive all three parameters d, k, and k m toward zero. In this
case we expect that most markets will ultimately be in a conﬁguration near the origin in region 2 of
ﬁgure 8. Our theoretical results predict that middlemen and market makers will coexist, with each handling
approximately half of the total volume of trade.
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